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Learning the wrong lessons from success? ...
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, your Excellencies, zeer 
gewaardeerde toehoorders, 
It was December 1989, one of those evenings when darkness 
seems to come particularly early. Bulgaria’s communist party 
leader of many years Todor Zhivkov had been deposed a few 
weeks earlier. I had taken a taxi to the so-called tent town 
of protest outside my university where some lecturers were 
demonstrating for removal of article one of the Bulgarian 
constitution, about the leading role of the communist party. 
Public transport being unreliable and taxis rare, the taxi driver 
picked another passenger to share the ride. As we approached 
the university, the other passenger took out something from 
his bag, which turned out to be a pair of handcuffs. The way 
he absent-mindedly played with the handcuffs and the fact 
that his destination was the same as mine filled me with 
apprehension. 
That evening and several after it, we were holding our breath, 
wondering whether the communist government that had 
been in power for 45 years would send the army against 
the demonstrations and protests which I also joined. The 
knowledge of the suppression of protests at Tiananmen 
square made us feel that seeing tanks in the streets was a 
real possibility. The battle to have article 1 of the communist 
constitution removed was won bloodlessly, but I did not know 
that, in that November evening. Neither did I ever find out for 
whom my fellow taxi passenger had prepared the handcuffs. 
That moment and these historic days left me with so many 
questions. For me, as for many others who took part in these 
fateful events, investigating transitions to democracy became 
an obvious and passionate choice.
Half a year later in an episode much less dramatic, but no less 
thought provoking, I travelled around Bulgaria interpreting 
for an economics scholar from Stanford’s Hoover Institution, 
working on an economic reform plan for the Bulgarian 
government. Being one of the founding fathers of US tax 
reform in the 1980s, the professor wanted to know whether 
the small shopkeepers and café owners we spoke to resented 
paying taxes. He expected they preferred low taxes, no state 
interference, no regulation. From their answers, I realized the 
American professor and the emerging Bulgarian entrepreneurs 
were worlds apart: they hoped the state would regulate 
the emerging market economy. I began to get a sense of a 
mismatch between what external advisors or donors might 
envisage and what people would want or need. My interest 
in the tensions between external governance and domestic 
responses was awakened. 
Experiences like these provided the motivation and the 
starting point of a research programme that focused around 
the questions: what happened with state, politics and society in 
the transition from communism in 1989? What role did elites 
and citizens play? What was the role of external actors and 
especially the European Union in building market and political 
institutions?
Today I would like to share some of the answers to these 
questions which my collaborators and I found in a research 
programme focusing on democratization and Europeanisation. 
First, I will tell you about the role the EU played in institution 
building in Central and Eastern Europe, why the Union 
became engaged in it and what happened with the institutions 
after enlargement. Next, I will discuss how citizens perceived 
institution building and enlargement. In the third part, I will 
highlight more examples of the transfer of governance from 
external actors across national borders. In the fourth part, I 
will explain why I believe the EU has learned the wrong lessons 
from the success of the Eastern enlargement and governance 
transfer through conditionality. I will argue that institution 
building is not enough to make post enlargement EU truly 
united and conditionality does not work in the same way when 
citizens are critical. In the end I will raise some interesting 
questions for future research on governance transfer in a global 
comparative perspective.
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The beginning of my quest to understand the post-communist 
transformations was the democratization literature that 
addressed directly the processes unfolding after 1989. This was 
a hopeful and optimistic literature, even as it was unashamedly 
elitist. Democracies, scholars like Giuseppe Di Palma and 
Philippe Schmitter argued, could be built ‘from above’ by elites 
willing to make choices for democracy. Democratic institutions 
could be ‘crafted’ and even previously non-democratic 
elites could do this, as Di Palma argued, as long as they saw 
democratization as their best option. The bulk of this literature, 
inspired by work on transitions in Spain, Portugal and Greece 
and before these Latin America, focused on the choices of 
elites in democratization, the sequencing of these choices, 
interaction with ‘the masses’. It stressed the importance of 
choosing suitable constitutional arrangements and the effects 
of different institutional choices on democratization prospects.
German sociologist Claus Offe was less optimistic. In a 
seminal article published in 1991, Offe anticipated the 
complexity of the choices facing elites in post communism, 
as market economy, political order and nationhood had to 
be re-built simultaneously. Offe argued that this simultaneity 
created a decision overload for elites and mutual effects of 
obstruction between the processes. Building market economy, 
democracy and state and identity interfered with each other. 
He anticipated problems: choice overload would prove too 
much for elites and citizen would lose patience. This article is 
still required reading for my students whom I always ask: how 
come democratization in CEE worked better than expected? 
The only hope, Offe suggested, was external guidance in 
making the crucial choices. The external actor providing the 
guidance in CEE turned out to be the European Union.
Countries from CEE applied to join the EU in the 1990s, as fast 
as they could get their act together. From 1993 onwards, they 
had an accession perspective, the late 1990s saw the start of 
negotiations. These were not negotiations between equals, but 
about candidates taking on the rules of the club. During the 
pre-accession period, the EU acquis - the policies of the Union 
- comprising between 80,000 to 100,000 pages of legislation, 
were imported into the legal systems of the candidate states. 
This method of enlargement whereby countries take the 
EU’s rules was labelled ‘enlargement governance’. A key tool 
of enlargement governance was the exchange of reforms for 
assistance and progress in negotiations, or ‘conditionality’.
Conditionality underpins EU enlargement and neighbourhood 
policies. Its foundations are legal provisions in treaties defining 
mutual relations: such as the so-called suspension clauses in 
the Association agreements with CEE which specified that 
the agreements would be suspended in case of violation of 
human rights or democratic principles. But conditionality 
is much more than these provisions. It is popularly known 
as the carrot and stick approach. It is more than that too. 
Today conditionality is both a policy tool and a principle 
underpinning dealings with candidate states and many 
neighbours.
How did conditionality come to be so important? The key to 
grasping this is understanding how it worked in Central and 
Eastern Europe. With a group of scholars gathered by Frank 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, we compared the 
effects of conditionality in different countries and sectors and 
explored explanations for these effects. The resulting 2005 
volume, The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, 
became known as the study of ‘Europeanisation East’. 
We discovered that the effects of conditionality were 
unmistakable: the EU was successful in inducing candidates to 
adopt rules and reforms, although there was variation between 
countries and sectors. We found that the mechanism behind 
these effects was best captured by a model called the external 
incentives model. This model expected that governments 
would respond to conditionality by making a cost benefit 
assessment. They would introduce reforms, often domestically 
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costly, only if the rewards outweighed the costs. The model 
stipulated that the rewards - accession - as well as the threat of 
exclusion needed to be credible.
Some scholars noted that there was also a socialization effect: 
some actors from CEE adopted and made their own the 
normative underpinnings of EU policy: environmental norms 
of clean air, reduction of emissions etc. However, the external 
incentives model - focusing on conditionality - generally 
seemed to explain the adoption of reforms better.
Having established that conditionality worked, as it often 
happens in science, new questions arose: what kind of rules did 
the EU promote and what happened to them after accession? 
The rules that the EU promoted targeted not only policy, but 
the very core of the candidates’ institutional and political 
systems. To do this, the EU defined the so called Copenhagen 
criteria for enlargement, specifying that to join countries 
need to have functioning democratic institutions and 
respect democratic principles and rule of law, have market 
economies and take on board all existing EU policies. The 
EU also elaborated and promoted principles for developing 
administrative capacity. 
More specifically, many rules candidates were asked to adopt 
were institutional: civil service and administration rules, 
rules creating High Councils of the Judiciary, domestic 
competition regulators, anti-discrimination commissions. 
Even more importantly, the EU promoted core principles 
of democratic governance by encouraging the candidate 
states to include opposition parties in key parliamentary 
committees, to broaden citizenship and ensure protection of 
national minorities. In addition, there were ad hoc conditions: 
requirements for closing nuclear power stations in Bulgaria 
and Lithuania, actions to improve conditions in orphanages in 
Romania.
You begin to see, I hope, how, by promoting rules pertaining to 
core domains of democratic governance and statehood, the EU 
did what Claus Offe considered necessary for the success of the 
multiple transformations. It provided a model promoting some 
choices of domestic elites and constraining others. A model of 
states and democratic institutions as they exist in continental 
Europe, different from the neo-patrimonial and oligarchic 
political systems emerging at the same time in Russia, or 
Central Asia.
Why did the EU do this and was it successful in creating 
institutions? 
The EU was concerned that the post-communist candidate 
states would not be ready for membership, for example that 
they would not have the administrative capacity to make the 
internal market a success. Therefore, the Union acted as a kind 
of institutional emergency service. The EU’s guidance did not 
come from a grand plan or blueprint for transformation: many 
of the reforms and assistance evolved came ad hoc, during the 
negotiations, when weaknesses in a certain area came to light. 
As we discovered, by and large, the countries did adopt 
the rules and reforms the EU recommended and required. 
For example, I assessed compliance with the EU’s so-called 
administrative conditionality requiring candidate states to 
establish Weberian style, politically neutral administrations, 
with merit-based recruitment. In the late 1990s and 2000s, 
most candidate states adopted laws and took measures to 
ensure that this happened. This was an impressive response to 
conditionality, especially compared to other cases of its use: 
IMF or World Bank conditionality had been around for years, 
but analyses showed that it did not have so much effect in 
inducing countries to undertake reforms. 
Conditionality and enlargement were a success also because 
the negative outcomes for the internal market or EU decision-
making did not materialise. This was one of our findings from 
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a research project financed by the EU’s FP 7 programme, 
entitled ‘Maximizing the Integration Capacity of the European 
Union: Lessons and prospects for enlargement and beyond’, 
(MAXCAP). In MAXCAP, we found that threats of deadlock 
in decision making did not materialize, nor did policy 
compliance suffer, due to the enormous investment from 
candidate states and EU in enlargement as a political and 
modernization project. 
The EU’s approach was seen as so successful that the term 
‘transformative power’ was coined to describe the effect of 
conditionality on the candidates (Grabbe 2006). The EU 
Commissioner for enlargement at the time, Olli Rehn, started 
referring to enlargement as the EU’s most successful foreign 
policy tool.
Of course, there were questions about the durability of 
governance transfer after accession. Both the scholarly and 
policy communities thought all this was too good to be true. 
Were the new rules Potemkin villages or, as I called them, 
‘empty shells’?
LSE colleague Ulrich Sedelmeier hypothesized that if 
conditionality depended on incentives and sanctions, the 
moment these stopped, reforms would be reversed. In 
MAXCAP research, he found that was not the generally case: 
compliance with EU acquis remained high, supported by 
the institutions developed during enlargement. In fact, the 
MAXCAP project confirmed what Dimiter Toshkov showed in 
his doctoral dissertation: implementation of the EU acquis was 
good in CEE states.
Here you must be wondering: but what about current 
developments in Poland and Hungary, problems with rule of 
law and the ‘illiberal democracy’ model that their governments 
champion with actions that have brought the term ‘backsliding’ 
in fashion? These developments certainly overshadow the 
success of EU enlargement. At the same time, there is a certain 
expectation that the EU can fix these backsliding democracies. 
Because of the success in enlargement we overestimate 
what conditionality can do. I will revisit this point later and 
explain why this may be the wrong lesson from the success 
of conditionality. But let’s first examine what happened to the 
institutions in CEE after accession.
In exploring this question I started from the work by Douglas 
North and Elinor Ostrom, both Nobel prize winners for their 
work on institutions. For North, institutions are ‘rules of the 
game in society, the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction’ (1990: 3). Ostrom defined institutions 
as ‘the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms 
of repetitive and structured interactions’ (2005: 3).1 Ostrom 
distinguished between formal rules that are enforceable by 
third parties and ‘rules-in-use’ - also called informal rules by 
others - often unwritten and not enforceable by third parties. 
She suggested in rule of law systems formal and rules-in-use 
were closely aligned. I defined institutionalization as a process 
where external imported rules and rules-in-use by domestic 
actors align closely.
Inspired by this theoretical work, in an article published in the 
Journal of European Public Policy in 2010, I argued that we 
should research institutionalization by exploring all possible 
outcomes: namely that rules domestic actors use would align 
with the imported rules, that actors would reverse imported 
rules after accession, or de-couple rules-in-use from formal 
rules. I theorized that the fate of the new institutions would 
depend on the interests and preferences of sectoral actors as 
well as government using the new rules. 
Subsequently I explored empirically the different scenarios in 
different policy sectors. Together with other case studies, we 
found a variety of outcomes: in some cases, formal rules and 
rules in-use aligned and true institutionalization resulted: for 
example, in the environmental sector. In other cases, imported 
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formal rules were reversed: that happened, for example, 
with provisions for politically neutral appointments at high 
administrative posts. Sometimes the rules were ignored or 
there was a de-coupling between formal and informal rules. 
In case you are wondering what de-coupling is, organisations 
present different rules to the outside than they actually 
use. It can be illustrated with the old joke about relations 
between workers and employers under communism: they are 
pretending to pay us and we are pretending to work. 
The essence of institutions, however, is that they affect people’s 
behaviour. Rules have to be meaningful for citizens if they are 
to really become institutions. But how did citizens perceive 
enlargement and the new institutions?
In the MAXCAP project, together with Elitsa Kortenska and 
several country teams, we empirically identified discourses 
on enlargement in six countries: two member states, the 
Netherlands and Germany, two recent members: Poland and 
Bulgaria, and two candidates, Serbia and Macedonia. 
To start with, citizens of the new member states were more aware 
of requirements and policies of the EU as they experienced the 
reforms during accession preparation. Many candidate states also 
held referenda on membership in which political leaders needed 
to explain the reforms and the choice for Europe. 
We found that new member state citizens had expectations 
for economic improvement, but also for better governance, 
governance based on impartial institutions. We also 
documented statements voicing a sense of unrealized 
opportunities: for example, village respondents in Bulgaria 
expressed regrets for the lack of economic opportunities for 
them combined with a strong desire to exclude Turkey from 
future enlargement.
And how did the citizens of the older member states who were 
hardly aware of these changes, experience enlargement?
We found that citizens from the Netherlands and Germany 
objected they had never been consulted on enlargement 
decisions. They felt insufficiently informed about enlargement. 
This is not surprising: especially in the West of Europe leaders 
seem to have made a concerted effort to keep enlargement 
outside the domain of political debates. For example, 
former director for accession negotiations in the European 
Commission Pierre Mirel pointed out there had been only 
two debates on Eastern enlargement in the French parliament 
during the whole period of negotiations.
In the Netherlands, perceived or real job losses mattered to the 
respondents who expressed criticism of enlargement. Exposure 
to workers from the new member also had an effect. An earlier 
quantitative analysis by Toshkov and Kortenska showed that 
there was a link between exposure to CEE migrants and votes 
against the EU constitutional treaty in the Dutch referendum 
of 2005.
Enlargement clearly did have consequences. These 
consequences have become more visible after the transitional 
restrictions on freedom of movement have been removed. For 
Central and Eastern European citizens freedom of movement 
was a crucial gain, not only because of the right to work 
elsewhere, but because it was what they had missed for so long: 
freedom. For citizens of the older member states, enlargement 
and freedom of movement brought changes, which not all 
citizens were prepared for, due to the lack of political debate 
and information. 
Furthermore, it is possible that citizens that are critical 
of enlargement in the West of Europe experienced it as a 
negative aspect of globalization. According to recent findings 
of an analysis by Catherine de Vries with the Bertelsmann 
Foundation, the free movement of workers is a key dimension 
of globalization citizens identify. According to the same 
Bertelsmann study, 44% of respondents consider globalization 
a threat. The Bertelsmann report nuances this by pointing 
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out that, a majority (66%) state they have had quite good 
experiences with regard to the accessibility of affordable goods 
and services.2 
Results from the regular Eurobarometer surveys paint a 
similarly contradictory picture: while according to the most 
recent edition the free movement of citizens and goods gathers 
the highest support by 81% of EU citizens, enlargement is the 
least supported among EU priorities; only 42% support future 
enlargement while 47% are against. The lack of sufficient public 
support for enlargement persists already for some time. It is 
likely that both perceived job losses and identity threats play 
a role in the assessment of potential accession of candidates 
from the Western Balkans. There is also other evidence - the 
outcome of the 2016 Dutch consultative referendum - that 
policies similar to enlargement such as the Association 
agreement with Ukraine - are increasingly questioned by 
citizens. 
These conflicting trends merit further research and reflection. 
Current scholarly debates on globalization suggest that it 
polarizes the population into winners and losers (Teney 
et al. 2013), losers being those citizens who perceive their 
chances to be diminished by it. Scholars suggest that objective 
socio-economic characteristics of losers of globalization (e.g. 
education, employment, age) are coupled with subjective 
perceptions of threat to their identity (Kriesi et al. 2013; Teney 
et al. 2013: 3). 
Addressing such subjective perceptions is hard. Furthermore, 
dealing with the effects of freedom of movement is exacerbated 
by the fact that debate on policy responses is often taken over 
by nationalists or populists. If there are pupils in Dutch schools 
who do not have the opportunity to learn well because they 
commute from other member states, this is certainly a public 
policy issue to address, but not via ‘meldpunt overlast Central 
en Oost Europa’, the hotline established by Geert Wilders for 
reporting problems with Eastern Europeans in the Netherlands.
If declining public support affects only enlargement and 
enlargement can be taken off the table, why should we care? 
The reason why we should pay attention to citizen responses 
to governance transfer is that there are more occasions of 
importing rules across national borders. When actors engage 
in long-term interactions across borders in which institutional 
rules and policies are transferred, this process can be labeled 
governance transfer. For example, rules enforcing international 
trade agreements. In my definition, governance transfer 
involves systematic interactions across borders which involve 
rules and engage, empower or constitute non-governmental 
actors next to governments. External actors can interact 
with civil society, experts, church or community leaders. 
Interactions and interventions, on the other hand, that are not 
structural and repeated over time, for example the imposition 
of sanctions or use of energy for geopolitical ends, are not 
governance transfer. Thus defined, the governance transfer 
concept comes close to the external governance defined by 
Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig. However, in 
my conceptualization governance transfer is a process that 
often involves asymmetry of power or expertise. There is also 
variation in tools and in how successful governance transfer is.
Consider these examples:
First, the eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the work of the 
so-called Troika of the IMF, the European Commission and 
the ECB in Ireland and Greece. The EU, together with the 
IMF, provided assistance coupled with strong conditionality 
to these countries: the essence of the approach to fix the 
problems that led to the crisis was the provision of incentives 
(financial support) in exchange for progress in reform. While 
the approach worked in Ireland, for Greece, conditionality 
appeared not to achieve much. EU external guidance bore 
many of the hallmarks of the approach developed during EU 
enlargement, but it found little resonance among Greek elites 
or citizens. 
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The second example of EU governance transfer is the 
European neighbourhood policy, created in 2006, following 
the enlargement blueprint. In Ukraine, one of the countries 
targeted by the ENP, however, reforms did not proceed with 
such rapid steps as they had done in Poland or the Czech 
Republic. Reforms even faltered, as the EU discovered in 
2013 when former Ukrainian President Yanukovich refused 
to sign the long negotiated association agreement with the 
EU. Even after the dramatic events of the Euromaidan and 
the signing and finally ratification of the agreement, adopted 
rules are rarely institutionalized, and reforms are only partially 
implemented in Ukraine. For example, in December 2017, 
the EU and US had to intervene to prevent the Ukrainian 
parliament from passing a draft law controlling the National 
Anti-corruption bureau of Ukraine and firing its head, Artyom 
Sitnik. 
Clearly, the mechanisms behind EU conditionality work less 
well in the neighbourhood: we explore the reasons why in 
the Horizon2020 project ‘The EU and Eastern partnership 
countries: An Inside-out analysis and strategic assessment’ 
(EU-STRAT). The Leiden EU-STRAT team has been 
investigating what factors shape citizen perceptions and 
preferences on regional integration or external cooperation. 
EU-STRAT also compares Russia’s mode of governance 
transfer and its tools, which involve less conditionality 
and more informal connections with societal actors and 
disinformation tools.3
Third example, back to enlargement, here and now. On 7 
November 2017 the chief of the police corps of Rotterdam 
gave an Nieuwsuur interview reporting he visited Albania to 
discuss cooperation against Albanian criminal networks. The 
visit was prompted by the realisation that Albanian criminals 
have been taking over the mafia business in heroin trade 
in Rotterdam harbour. The chief of police was expecting 
cooperation because, as he stated, Albanian authorities were 
working to join the European Union. This is a clear example 
of enlargement conditionality used as a tool to achieve specific 
policy goals by referring to potential accession, even though 
you will never catch anyone from the Dutch government 
publicly stating that Albania is a credible candidate for 
accession. Nor will the government engage in a public debate 
about the ongoing negotiations with, for example, Serbia. 
The process is, however, in motion and recently new steps 
have been taken. The European Commission proposed a new 
strategy for the Western Balkans in February 2018, for the 
first time proposing a target date for some candidates, 2025. 
The process is defined as merit-based and benchmarks and 
enlargement conditionality are key tools again.
Let me be clear: I am in favour of accession by Western 
Balkan candidates for regional stability and peace, but also 
as it gives the citizens of the region the best chance to realise 
improvements in governance they badly need. However, based 
on critical reflection on the evolution of the enlargement 
method of governance transfer, I do not believe the same 
method, with even more conditionality, can achieve the needed 
reform results. 
My argument is that we need to consider whether we have 
learned the wrong lessons from the success of enlargement 
conditionality in terms of both research findings and current 
policy.
In terms of research findings, our expectation that the EU can 
continue to be a transformative power has been a product of 
findings based on a comparative case research design in which 
a number of factors influenced outcomes in a similar direction. 
We analyzed the CEE cases as they became historically 
available in the 1990s. But the situation in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s was uniquely favourable, a happy conjunction of 
historical circumstances. It was also quite different than it is 
now, in terms of geopolitics, ideas and public opinion.
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Geopolitically, in the 1990s, the EU was the only game in town 
for post-communist states in terms of regional integration 
and cooperation. Both geopolitical and ideational factors 
worldwide appeared so favourable that Francis Fukyuama 
argued that the world was about to reach the end of the road of 
history in terms of models for development. Liberal democracy 
had become the final destination.
That clearly did not happen, in fact, at present we witness 
threats to democracy and stability in Europe to make one 
wonder if the end of history of liberalism is in sight. Backsliding 
in Central and Eastern Europe, instability and conflicts in the 
EU’s neighbourhood, where, as The Economist put it, the EU 
faces a circle of fire instead of a circle of friends. 
In terms of current policy, the politicization of EU policies 
including enlargement, is, in my view, the most important 
difference with the 1990s. Political parties on the extreme 
right or left can and do mobilise citizens feeling as losers of 
globalisation. It is an illusion to think that such citizens will 
not find an (electoral) outlet to protest or stop the ratification 
of potential accession treaties. The position of EU member 
state governments, that insist on far reaching reforms in 
candidate states in exchange of (the promise of) accession, 
becomes less credible or simply hypocritical.
For conditionality to work, both the promised reward and 
sanctions must be credible. But here the lack of domestic 
debate and the increasingly unsupportive public opinion 
come into play. With serious opposition, domestically, in key 
member states, such as the Netherlands, the credibility of 
conditionality diminishes. 
At the same time, the rise of the ideas and practice of the so-
called ‘illiberal democracy’ in Central and Eastern European 
EU member states is a major cause for concern. There is a 
populist turn towards an imagined past, after decades of 
looking to the future. As Ivan Krastev commented in The New 
York Times in December 2017, the populists of Central and 
Eastern Europe aspire to keep society frozen as a reaction to 
change while their electorate does not seem to care if they fulfil 
their policy promises. Illiberal civil society seems to rise. As 
Venelin Ganev wrote recently, Homo Post-Sovieticus inherited 
some features of the Homo Sovieticus: uncivil competences and 
actions.
But can the EU do something about these trends? Many 
have suggested the EU should develop a much more robust 
response to the erosion of democratic institutions in Hungary 
or Poland. We expect the EU to fix these democracies, with 
the President of the Commission swooping down from the 
sky like the Deux ex machina from ancient Greek tragedies, 
whereby, as Wikipedia tells us, ‘a seemingly unsolvable problem 
is suddenly and abruptly resolved by the inspired and unexpected 
intervention of some… character. Its function can be to resolve 
an otherwise irresolvable plot situation, to surprise the audience, 
to bring the tale to a happy ending, or act as a comedic device.’ 
I hope that the EU does not become a comedic device in 
Hungarian or Polish current government circles.
While I certainly believe that the Union should explore 
available options for limiting economic transfers and political 
support for illiberal regimes, the EU should not, in my view, 
be expected to fix them. The erosion of democracy that these 
political systems experience is rooted in societal and political 
economy processes and linked to the rise of specific elites and 
constituencies. If the EU were to systematically influence such 
deep societal and political relations, it might destroy the very 
democracy it tries to rescue, in the sense that its rules would 
support it from the outside, as an exoskeleton. We can refer 
here again to Ostrom (2005: 130) citing experiments with 
groups subjected (or not) to external rules. These experiments 
established that while groups provided with external rules 
performed initially better, later, external rules crowded 
out cooperative behavior and thus impeded internal norm 
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formation. The period of external governance transfer to CEE 
should not last forever - societies should make their own steps 
towards internal norm formation. Citizens in the region should 
do well to heed German legal scholar Rudolf von Jhering’s 
perspective on the struggle for law, courtesy of Bulgarian 
scholar and friend Kristian Takov:
A principle of law won without toil is on a level with children 
brought by the stork: what the stork has brought, the fox or 
the vulture can take away again. But from the mother who 
gave it birth, neither the fox nor the vulture can take the child 
away; and just as little can a people be deprived of the laws or 
institutions which they have had to labour and to bleed for, in 
order to obtain. (1915: 19).
Let me re-cap:
The European Union supported institution building in 
candidate states quite successfully, but governance transfer 
has reached its internal and external limits. In terms of the 
ongoing enlargement negotiations, conditionality targeting 
governments, is simply not meant to inspire citizens. This is 
a serious problem, since permissive consensus for European 
integration has been replaced by, in Hooghe and Marks’ term, 
‘constraining dissensus’. Moving further with enlargement 
without domestic debate in the existing member states or 
candidates fuels suspicions that EU elites disregard citizens. 
Yet for the EU, conditionality’s past success has led to a 
tendency to apply more and more of it externally, towards the 
next group of candidates. More conditionality without a real 
promise for accession may be counter-productive and result 
in a situation similar to that old communist joke I mentioned: 
candidate state governments would pretend they are reforming 
and we would pretend that we will accept them.
Internally, in the Union now, the unification of Europe remains 
incomplete as there has been insufficient debate as to what the 
new ‘Europe undivided’ (Vachudova 2005) means for citizens 
across east and west, north and south. If we want to keep 
the EU united, the EU leaders should consider engaging in a 
communicative discourse of what Europe means as suggested 
by Vivien Schmidt. The example of EU-handshakes process in 
Sweden is, as commentator Caroline de Gruyter has suggested4, 
one innovative way to initiate a dialogue with citizens about 
their wishes and ideas on the shape of Europe of the future.
With respect to the newer member states, dialogue with them 
as equals appears quite limited. Some prominent voices such 
as former Estonian President Thomas Ylves or Slovak MEP 
Edward Kukan even speak of a patronizing attitude from 
the older member states or of being treated as ‘second hand 
citizens’. A patronizing attitude does not support socialization 
into common norms and values, because these are usually 
adopted in equal settings. Furthermore, for populists in 
the newer member states, the sense of being approached 
as second-class citizens provides a convenient excuse for 
engaging in nationalistic rhetoric.
We should bear in mind that the Cold War’s propaganda 
stereotypes have not disappeared from public memory. Even 
students sometimes refer to ‘Eastern bloc countries’. Consider 
the weather report. If the area where recent member states 
Bulgaria and Romania are located is mentioned at all, it is 
with a vague wave of the hand and the label ‘Griekenland en 
de Balkan’ - Greece and the Balkans. Other recent member 
states - for example the Czech Republic or Slovakia - are never 
mentioned.
Now I am not pleading for special five seconds dedicated to 
Slovakia in the Dutch weather report. Bulgarian meteorologists 
are similarly vague on where the rain falls in Western Europe. 
What these examples suggest is that for many, the other side 
of the EU is still off their mental maps, like the unknown 
territories of old, where the map says: ‘Here be dragons’.
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Enlargement did not ‘make’ Europeans across east and south, 
north and west in the EU. We should not expect that it would, 
as it would require societal engineering on a scale comparable 
to the efforts ‘create’ the ‘socialist man’. But we should certainly 
consider what - policy measures, initiatives and debates - could 
replace mutual ignorance.
We should explore under what conditions citizens may 
activate a European identity next to their national one. Guerra 
and Serricchio (2014), for example, found that people who 
have travelled and taken advantage of the EU’s freedom of 
movement became more pro-European - a phenomenon 
labelled ‘experienced identity’. 
More broadly, we need to investigate different types and 
effects of governance transfer. Governance transfer may be a 
disruption to established institutions and policies in highly 
developed democracies, but it may also improve citizen lives 
elsewhere. We need to consider how authoritarian actors go 
about governance transfer? Does governance transfer increase 
globalization or tame it with rules? Specific external rules such 
as trade agreements need to be investigated with a view to their 
effect on domestic institutions and policies. How much policy 
space - a term coined by Harvard economist Dani Rodrik 
- do regional or global trade agreements leave for national 
policy makers? What are the citizen responses to governance 
transfer in different settings? These are important questions 
and exciting lines of comparative inquiry. I look forward to 
exploring them.
In science but also in life, there are always more people who 
make us who we become than we can acknowledge. So, my 
words of thanks are necessarily limited, but my gratitude and 
appreciation of people providing inspiration and support, are 
not.
I would like to begin by thanking the Executive Board 
of Leiden University for appointing me at the chair for 
Comparative Governance at the Institute for Security and 
Global Affairs. I warmly thank Sandra Groeneveld, Kutsal 
Yesilkagit and Edwin Bakker who have actively supported this 
appointment and ensured that it became a reality. I would also 
like to thank Theo Toonen, who welcomed me to the FSW, 
David Lowery and Rene Torenvlied from whom I have learned 
different things about academic leadership. And, one more 
professor from Leiden University that I have never met, but am 
grateful for: Sophia Antoniadis: thanks for hanging in there!
Two people who have been examples and mentors deserve 
special mention: Philippe Schmitter, supported me from 
the time I was a Master’s student. And my teacher in 
Europeanization, Adrienne Héritier, an inspiration with her 
rigour and supportive attitude.
As I mentioned I have been part of an intellectual community 
of social scientists dedicated to exploring post-communist 
transformations, I would like to thank many scholars from 
this community: Venelin Ganev, Ivan Krastev, Rilka Dragneva, 
Adam Fagan, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Petr Kopecky, Maria 
Spirova. 
I am grateful for the long-standing collaboration with Frank 
Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier and Tanja Boerzel, with 
whom we developed the MAXCAP and EU-STRAT projects. 
And thanks to Ellen Mastenbroek, who provided support with 
data collection and the unexpected bonus of a shanty choir.
Scientific work for me is about intellectual exchange and 
learning new things in collaboration: for this, I would like 
to thank the team of colleagues in Leiden: Dimiter Toshkov, 
Honorata Mazepus, Elitsa Kortenska. Looking forward to 
promising future collaboration, I would like to thank my 
colleagues at ISGA who have warmly welcomed me: especially 
Bibi van der Berg, Sanneke Kuipers, Caroline de Ruiter and 
Madeleine Hosli.
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I would like to thank the enthusiastic students of this faculty 
for the questions they have asked me through the years that 
have forced me to sharpen my arguments and explain them 
better.
My final thanks are to my family, which comprises many 
different people. My father and my mother, who would have 
been proud in their own different ways, one being more 
surprised than the other.
My family in the Netherlands, it is so special to have you 
standing in for my parents here and sharing the joy of this 
day. My family in Bulgaria, my uncle and close friends and 
especially the friends who jumped on a plane from Sofia, 
Dublin, New York, Rennes and Birmingham to be here: your 
support means a lot to me, now and always! 
Scholarship is for me also about the joy of discovery and the 
challenge of looking for the next one. When it comes to these 
there is one person I need to thank above all. My partner 
Bernard. For so much more than I can name here. But, in 
this setting, for the difficult questions and pushing me not 
to be satisfied with easy answers. For unwavering support in 
my journey of discovery and not doubting me even when I 
doubt myself. For the intellectual partnership and the joy of 
exchanging ideas.
Last but by no means least, my children, for your support and 
teamwork, for being here and being who you are. And for 
sharing the dream of united Europe with me.
Ik heb gezegd.
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Notes
1 Both North and Ostrom included, over time, additional 
components next to rules in their conceptualization of 
institutions. North added informal norms of behaviour 
and shared beliefs about the world (North Wallis and 
Weingast 2009: 15). Ostrom integrated experimental 
findings in her conceptualization. For example, she 
stressed that in open strategic situations actors would take 
into account norms such as reciprocity, trust and equity. 
2 Globalization and citizens: Threat or opportunity. 
(https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/aktuelle-
meldungen/2018/januar/europeans-see-the-eu-as-a-
protective-umbrella-in-the-era-of-globalization/
3 Complementing this line of inquiry, in the Capturing Bias 
project part of the NWA, together with Prof. Lora Aroyo’s 
computer science group, we aim to find whether bias in 
news (potentially influencing citizens in the region) can 
be identified through computer-human interactions.
4 Caroline de Gruyter, ‘Kijk die Zweden nu eens!’ NRC 
Handelsblad, 13-14 januari 2018, p. 17.
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